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A PRIMER ON U.S. INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPLICABLE TO 
MUSIC INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 
SYSTEMS 
Michael W. Carroll* 
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page breaks are sometimes in awkward places due to typeface 
constraints.] 
 
Digital technology has had a significant impact on the ways in 
which music information can be stored, transmitted, and used.  Within 
the information sciences, music information retrieval has become an 
increasingly important and complex field.  This brief article is addressed 
primarily to those involved in the design and implementation of systems 
for storing and retrieving digital files containing musical notation, 
recorded music, and relevant metadata – hereinafter referred to as a 
Music Information Retrieval System (“MIRS”).  In particular, this group 
includes information specialists, software engineers, and the attorneys 
who advise them.  Although peer-to-peer computer applications, such as 
Napster’s MusicShare or the Kazaa Media Desktop, can be conceived of 
as creating a MIRS, my analysis focuses on MIRS designed or operated 
by an entity that takes responsibility for choosing and controlling the 
music information stored in the system.  Examples would include digital 
music collections stored in research libraries or on university intranets, 
as well as commercial systems with similar design features. 
This article describes how certain provisions of U. S. intellectual 
property law apply to MIRSs and mentions relevant law in the European 
Union for purposes of comparison.  The focus is on U. S. copyright law, 
with very brief mention of U.S. patent and trade secret law.  Additionally, 
the article mentions proposed legislation for database protection, which 
already exists in the European Union.  Enactment of such legislation 
could be very significant for developers and operators of MIRS. 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  Thanks go to the anonymous 
referee for helpful comments.  Any mistakes, of course, remain mine.  This Article is licensed under a Creative 
Commons Attribution License.  See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/. 
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I. COPYRIGHT LAW 
Copyright is important to those involved in designing and operating 
MIRS for two different reasons.  First, copyright law constrains the uses of the 
data in MIRS because the law grants creators of data and their assigns 
exclusive rights in the music information.1  Designers, and users of MIRS need 
permission from the owners of the rights in the music information for many 
uses.2  Second, those who build MIRS receive rights from copyright law in the 
original selection and arrangement of musical information stored in the MIRS, 
as well as in software designed for use in MIRS.  For these reasons, the 
discussion of copyright covers both rights in musical information and rights in 
MIRS. 
A. What is Copyrightable? 
The U. S. Constitution permits Congress to grant to “authors” exclusive 
rights to their respective “writings” for “limited times.”3  As interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, this provision gives Congress considerable flexibility in 
determining the scope and duration of copyright protection.4 
1. Originality 
A work must be “original,” meaning that the work must have been 
independently created by the author and it must reflect a minimal spark of 
creativity.5  In the field of music information, two different copyrightable 
works are recognized. 
First, the underlying composition, called the “musical work,” is 
comprised of the original expression in the music and lyrics.6  Almost all 
musical compositions satisfy the originality requirement.  Even compositions 
that are highly derivative of prior works usually contain some original 
material.7  Copyright protection is limited to the original material added by the 
composer or publisher.8 
 
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (“An owner 
of a copyright has the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, and publicly display copies of the work.”). 
 2. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014, 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding users directly liable and Napster contributorily and vicariously liable for the infringement of 
copyrights in both musical works and sound recordings). 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 4. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200-04 (2003) (retrospective extension of copyright does 
not violate the “limited Times” restriction); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1973) (stating 
Congress has broad discretion to identify protectible “writings”). 
 5. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 6. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2000). 
 7. Cf. Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2003) (assuming that a three-note sequence 
was a protectable musical work). 
 8. See Entm’t Research Group v. Genesis Creative Group, 122 F.3d 1211, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(“[C]opyright protection afforded to derivative works is more limited than it is for original works of 
authorship.  Specifically, Section 103(b) provides that the copyright in a derivative work ‘extends only to the 
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Second, since 1972, federal law has recognized that original expression 
also goes into the recorded version of a musical work.9  The creative decisions 
made by the performers, sound engineers, and producers collectively are 
captured in the “sound recording” of the musical works.10  Thus, even if a 
MIRS comprises only recorded renditions of musical works whose copyright 
has expired – say, a collection of Mozart’s works – the orchestra or its 
recording company likely owns the copyright in the sound recording of those 
musical works that are in the public domain. 
It should not be surprising that most music information in MIRS will be 
original.  However, the generous originality standard also means that the MIRS 
itself may constitute one or more original works of authorship.  The selection 
and arrangement of information in a compilation or collection may be 
sufficiently original to be copyrightable.11  The key is whether the judgments 
made by the person(s) selecting and arranging the data require the exercise of 
sufficient discretion to make the selection or arrangement “original.”12  In Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, which announced the 
originality requirement, the Court held that a white pages telephone directory 
could not be copyrighted.13  The data—the telephone numbers and addresses—
were “facts” which were not original because they had no “author.”14  Also, the 
selection and arrangement of the facts did not meet the originality requirement 
because the decision to alphabetize all the numbers and addresses in a certain 
geographic area did not reflect the “minimal spark” of creativity needed.15 
The selection and arrangement of music information stored in a MIRS 
can be sufficiently original to satisfy copyright law’s requirement.  If the other 
copyrightability requirements are satisfied, the creator of the MIRS may have a 
right to claim infringement against anyone who copies the MIRS database 
without authorization.  Adding a layer of complexity, original expression in a 
MIRS may include the selection and arrangement of the metadata describing 
the music information.  For example, if the MIRS designer makes sufficiently 
original choices about 
 
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in 
the work.”) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994)); see also Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
 9. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7) (2000); Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 322 
(2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the legislative history of the sound recording amendment). 
 10. E.g., Sys. XIX, Inc. v. Parker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing legislative history 
for the proposition that authorship of a sound recording is likely to include the creative contributions of 
performers and record producers). 
 11. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991). 
 12. See Id. at 360. 
 13. Id. at 361. 
 14. Id. at 361-62. 
 15. Id. at 362-63. 
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how to classify the music information or how to describe the music 
information, the metadata may also constitute a copyrightable work.16 
To the extent that software is used in a MIRS, software is protectable as a 
“literary work.”17  So long as the code reflects the exercise of editorial 
discretion, it is protectable.  As is discussed below, the scope of protection is 
limited.18 
2. Fixation 
A work must also be “fixed” in any medium permitting the work to be 
“perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
a transitory duration.”19 An original musical composition is not copyrighted 
until it is recorded in some way—in musical notation or in a recorded 
performance.  Sound recordings are by definition recorded and thus are 
copyrighted so long as the decisions going into the recording reflect the 
requisite originality.20  Finally, the structure and arrangement of a MIRS may 
be fixed any time that it is written down or implemented.  Fixation of the work 
is a momentous occasion for works created after January 1, 1978, because 
exclusive rights under copyright shower down upon the creator at the moment 
of fixation.21  Previously, rights in published works attached only when 
registered and published with notice.22 
B. What Rights Does Copyright Grant? 
What are the rights that attach to a creator at the moment the work is 
fixed?  With regard to musical information and MIRS, it depends.  The owner 
of any copyright has: (1) the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work 
 
 16. Copyright protection would not, however, be appropriate is the metadata is not sufficiently original.  
For example, metadata that merely identifies the names of composers or performers, dates of composition, 
publication, and performance would probably not be sufficiently original, however such data were arranged.  
But if the metadata also included information about musical sources that inspired a particular work or 
information about other recordings on which performers had played, then the metadata would more likely be 
sufficiently original to be copyrightable.  An example of a complex metadatabase describing music 
information is the community-compilation, MusicBrainz, at http://www.musicbrainz.org (last visited Mar. 5, 
2004). 
 17. Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Computer programs are entitled to copyright protection as ‘literary works.’”); Computer Mgmt. Assistance 
Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Computer programs are entitled to 
copyright protection.”); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that the Copyright Act was amended in 1976 “to include computer programs in the definition of protectable 
literary works”). 
 18. A caveat for MIRS protection is that when functional considerations essentially dictate the design of 
either the data structure or the software, the work will not be deemed original.  Functional considerations can 
include the decision to adopt an “industry standard” structure. Cf. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 
707 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining and applying merger doctrine). 
 19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (2000). 
 20. See, e.g., Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 n.6 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 21. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). 
 22. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 674 n.20 (7th 
Cir. 1986); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976). 
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in copies or phonorecords;”23 (2) the right “to prepare derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work;”24 and (3) the right “to distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”25  In addition the owners of musical 
and literary works—which would include software and, potentially, a MIRS 
data structure—have (4) the right to perform the copyrighted work publicly26 
and (5) the right to display the copyrighted work publicly.27  Sound recordings 
have a more limited performance right, which is (6) the right to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.28  The 
rights in musical information most relevant to the use of a MIRS are the rights 
of reproduction, distribution, and performance. 
1. Reproduction 
The reproduction right covers both exact duplicates of a work and works 
that are “substantially similar” to the copyrighted work when it can be shown 
that the alleged copyist had access to the copyrighted work.29  Digital 
technology has broadened the scope of the reproduction right because 
computers necessarily make exact duplicates of data when processing or 
transmitting it.  The courts have held that even a temporary copy of a 
copyrighted work stored in a computer’s random access memory (“RAM”) 
exercises the right to reproduce the work.30 
Consequently, the operator of a MIRS with digital data must have 
permission not only to store a copy of the musical work and/or sound recording 
on a hard disk or other similar medium, but also permission to make the copies 
that a user will make to view the musical information while stored in RAM and 
any copies the user will receive when accessing the MIRS through a computer 
network. 
Reproductions of sound recordings necessarily involve the reproduction 
of the underlying musical work.  Thus, in many cases, 
 
 23. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000). 
 24. Id. § 106(2). 
 25. Id. § 106(3). 
 26. Id. § 106(4). 
 27. Id. § 106(5). 
 28. Id. § 106(6). 
 29. See, e.g., Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 892 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the song “Till You” did not 
infringe copyright the for the song “Close Every Door”); Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973, 975 (11th 
Cir. 1986) (stating that the song “I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke” was an independent creation and did not 
infringe on the copyright of the song “Don’t Cha Know”); Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 905 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(stating that the plaintiff failed to show that the musical group the Bee Gees had access to plaintiff’s song “Let 
It End” before they composed “How Deep Is Your Love”); Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (stating that the composer failed to show both that the performer had access to “Sell Your Soul” and the 
necessary “striking similarity” between the songs). 
 30. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).  See generally  
Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1245 (2001) (arguing that ownership of physical copy is a hidden presumption in copyright law that 
should be updated with respect to digital copies). 
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permission to reproduce both the musical work and the sound recording must 
be obtained. 
A more vexing question arises with regard to the scope of the 
reproduction right with respect to streaming audio files.  If a MIRS permits 
users to stream audio files without receiving a permanent copy, what rights 
must the operator of the MIRS have?  Audio streaming involves the making of 
temporary buffer copies during transmission.  It remains uncertain whether 
these copies are sufficiently permanent to implicate the reproduction right.31  
The European Union has made explicit that temporary buffer copies do not 
implicate the right of reproduction.32 
2. Distribution 
The distribution right applies to the distribution of copies to the public.  
In the off-line world, the distribution right would be the basis for a recording 
company’s lawsuit against the sellers of unauthorized recordings.  In the digital 
context, one could argue that the distribution right does not apply because 
computers do not distribute a single copy from point A to point B; instead, they 
generate new copies.33  Thus far, the courts have not adopted this interpretation 
and have also given the distribution right a broad reading.  Some courts, 
including the appeals court in the Napster case, have held that merely exposing 
an MP3 file to the Internet is a public distribution of the file.34  Consequently, 
in any license agreement for the musical information stored in a MIRS, the 
operator will need permission to distribute the copyrighted works—the musical 
works and the sound recordings (where applicable)—if the system permits 
users to download copies. 
The harder case would involve systems that permit streaming-only access 
to recorded music.  If a system operator would need a license to reproduce the 
musical information because of the buffer and cache copies made during the 
streaming process, then the system operator probably also needs a license to 
publicly distribute those evanescent copies. 
 
 31. See R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major 
Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 252 (2001).  An agreement between the music 
publishers and the recording industry treats these ephemeral copies as “copies” requiring a license.  Id. 
 32. See INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF MUSIC PUBLISHERS, SECOND WIPO INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001), available at 
http://ecommerce.wipo.int/meetings/2001/conference/presentations/pdf/vacher.pdf. 
 33. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Disruptive Technology and Common Law Lawmaking: A Brief 
Analysis of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 16 n.52 (2002). 
 34. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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3. Public Performance 
With regard to musical information, two different performance rights 
apply.  For underlying musical works, the copyright owner has the exclusive 
right to authorize any public performance, subject to the fair use privilege and 
certain statutory exceptions.35  The right of public performance applies 
whenever the copyrighted work can be listened to or watched by members of 
the public at large, such as during a live performance or recorded performance 
made available by broadcast or digital streaming.36  Copyright owners in sound 
recordings, by contrast, have an exclusive right only in public performances 
done by “digital audio transmission.”37  Digital streaming of an audio file 
would be a digital audio transmission of a sound recording.  One practical 
effect of the distinct performance rights is to treat broadcasters and webcasters 
differently—broadcasters need a license only from the composers or publishers 
whereas webcasters need a license from both the composers or publishers and 
from the sound recording copyright owners.  The operators of a MIRS that 
permits digital audio streaming of copyrighted musical works or sound 
recordings similarly would need licenses from both the composers’ 
representatives and the sound recording owners’ representatives. 
Adding another layer of complexity and uncertainty is the alternative to 
applying reproduction and distribution rights to streaming-only audio.  In that 
case, the question is whether the unambiguous public performance also is a 
reproduction and distribution.  With respect to MIRS that permit downloading 
of audio files, which unambiguously exercise at least the right of reproduction, 
arguments have been made that public performance rights also are exercised 
because the file often can be listened to as the download takes place.38 
4. Public Display 
The owner of the copyright in a musical work also has the exclusive right 
to publicly display the work.39  To the author’s knowledge, this right has not 
been the subject of much dispute or attention because musical works 
traditionally have been copied and distributed in sheet music form or have 
been performed.  The 
 
 35. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000). 
 36. Id. at § 101; Home Box Office, Inc. v. Corinth Motel, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (N.D. Miss. 
1986) (“Public performance [of copyrighted material] occurs when a work is transmitted with any device to 
the public for reception in separate places.”); Entm’t & Sports Programming Network, Inc. v. Edinburg Cmty. 
Hotel, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1334, 1340 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (“A public performance [of a copyrighted work] also 
occurs when a work is transmitted with any device to the public for reception in separate places.”). 
 37. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(6), 114(j)(5) (2000) 
 38. See, e.g., Samval Fifer, Changing Horses in Mid-Stream: The Copyright Office’s New Rule Makes 
Broadcasters Pay for “Streaming” Their Signals Over the Internet, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 182 (2001). 
 39. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2000). 
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Internet and other digital networks may increase attention on the display right 
because posting a musical score to an online location from which it can be 
viewed by the general public almost certainly would be considered a public 
display of the work.40  Indeed, because a musical work is defined to include 
lyrics, the many Web sites that publish lyrics are likely engaged in the public 
display of those musical works.  Operators of MIRS that permit online display 
of music and/or lyrics should obtain permission to publicly display the musical 
work. 
5. Prepare Derivative Works 
“A ‘derivative work’ is work based upon one or more preexisting works” 
that consists of elaborations or modifications that, taken as whole, are 
themselves original works of authorship.41  That is, a derivative work has two 
characteristics: (1) it incorporates a pre-existing copyrighted work; and (2) it 
has sufficiently original modifications to allow for recognition of a new 
copyrighted work.42 With regard to music information, some easy examples 
are sound recordings (the editorial decisions involved in rendering the musical 
work create a new work), musical arrangements (same), and parodies (e.g., the 
oeuvre of Weird Al Yankovic is comprised of derivative works).  Within the 
music industry, the right to make derivative works is implicated most often by 
new compositions based on pre-existing compositions (including samples of 
prior recordings), sound recordings of pre-existing compositions, and use of 
recorded music in audiovisual works, such as movies, television shows, and 
advertisements.43 
For those who build MIRS, more subtle forms of the derivative works 
right may be implicated.  If a MIRS designer must make discretionary 
decisions in choosing how to translate music information in analog form into 
digital form, the MIRS designer may have a “thin” copyright in the digital 
version.  The same may be said for the decisions involved in translating a work 
from one digital format to another.  The digital work would be a derivative 
work comprised of the underlying 
 
 40. Cf. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (parties conceded that posting 
photographs to an online location implicated both the right of reproduction and right of display). 
 41. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 106(2) (2000). 
 42. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223 (1990) (noting that “aspects of a derivative work added by 
the derivative author are that author’s property, but the element drawn from the pre-existing work remains on 
grant from the owner of the pre-existing work”); see also Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
 43. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10, 24 (1979) (holding 
that the issuance by ASCAP and BMI of blanket licenses for television networks to use copyrighted musical 
works is not per se unlawful under antitrust laws); Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 597-98 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(The Beastie Boys did not exceed the scope of their license to “sample” plaintiff’s composition.); Carte v 
Evans, 27 F. 861, 864-65 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886) (Piano-forte arrangement of an opera orchestral score is an 
original musical composition and subject to copyright.). 
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copyrighted work and the new work embodied in the digital object.  This 
“thin” copyrighted work would be similar to the copyright claimed by those 
who reformat movies to be shown on television.44  The copyright is “thin” 
because it is limited to that particular form of digitization and can be asserted 
against only those who copy that particular form of digitization.45  This right 
could have economic importance if, for example, a competitor copied digital 
files of public domain sound recordings from a MIRS.  The only potential 
copyright claimant in such a case would be the MIRS designer.  To create such 
a derivative work, however, the decisions involved in translating the 
copyrighted work would have to be more involved than the mere choice to 
encode a file in .mp3 format rather than  .wav format. 
The derivative works right also could be implicated if a MIRS were 
designed so as to permit users to edit or rearrange musical works or sound 
recordings.  Were that possible, the user could be directly liable for exercising 
the derivative works right without authorization.  The MIRS designer or 
operator, however, could also be held liable under theories of third-party 
liability for copyright infringement discussed immediately below. 
C. Theories of Third Party Liability 
Those who build or operate MIRS also have to be aware of theories of 
third party liability that could be asserted against them if their systems or 
software enable others to infringe copyrights.  Music publishers and record 
labels have asserted these theories against Napster and other developers of 
peer-to-peer networking software.46 
1. Contributory Infringement 
To contributorily infringe a copyright, one must (1) have actual or 
constructive knowledge of the direct infringer’s infringing conduct; and (2) 
substantially participate in, or materially contribute to, the infringing 
conduct.47 For builders or operators of MIRS, the second requirement likely 
will be met when the MIRS is used to accomplish the infringement. 
The harder question will be under what conditions the manufacturer or 
operator of a MIRS knows, or should know, that users are engaged in 
infringing conduct?  Evidence of actual knowledge would 
 
 44. See, e.g., Maljack Prods., Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1416, 1426-28 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding 
sufficient originality in pan-and-scan reformatting of public domain film for television to create copyrighted 
work in edited version). 
 45. See generally Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] thin copyright . . . protects 
against only virtually identical copying.”). 
 46. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding a preliminary 
injunction against the distribution of Aimster software and the operation of the Aimster system). 
 47. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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include discovering infringing conduct and then doing nothing to stop it.48  
Constructive knowledge could be shown when a reasonable person is aware of 
facts causing the person to inquire further as to whether infringement was 
occurring in connection with the MIRS, or when the facts would lead a 
reasonable person to infer in specific instances that the MIRS was being used 
for infringement of copyrights. 
One defense available to the manufacturer of a MIRS that can respond to 
an allegation of infringing conduct is the so-called Sony defense, announced by 
the Supreme Court in Sony Corporation v. Universal City Studios, Inc.49  
There, the Court did not impose contributory liability on the manufacturers of 
VCRs for infringing copies of television shows made by VCR owners.50 This 
defense articulates the common-sense reasoning that we do not hold the 
manufacturers of photocopiers liable when users make infringing copies of 
books or sheet music, even though the manufacturers know that this is one 
likely use of the technology.51  Under the Sony defense, the manufacturer of a 
technology that can be put to infringing use cannot be held to have constructive 
knowledge of infringement and, therefore, cannot be held liable for 
contributory infringement as long as the technology is capable of “substantial 
non-infringing uses.”52 
2. Vicarious Liability for Copyright Infringement 
Vicarious liability will apply whenever (1) one has control or supervisory 
power over the direct infringer’s infringing conduct and (2) one receives a 
direct financial benefit from the infringing conduct.53  Recent cases have 
expanded the scope of this kind of liability.  In the Napster case, the court held 
that Napster had control over its users because it could refuse them access to 
the Napster server and, pursuant to the Terms of Service Agreements entered 
into with users, could terminate access if infringing conduct was discovered.54  
Other courts have required a greater showing of actual control over the 
infringing conduct,55 but operators of MIRS should be aware that by merely 
asserting contractual rights to terminate access to the MIRS for infringing 
conduct may be sufficient to satisfy the control requirement.56 
 
 48. See id. at 1022 n.6 (stating that Napster executives had actual knowledge of users’ infringing 
conduct). 
 49. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650-51. 
 52. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-22. 
 53. Id. at 1022. 
 54. Id. at 1023-24. 
 55. See, e.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 437 n.18. 
 56. For an extended discussion and criticism of the expansive view of control, see Carroll, supra note 
33, at 25-29. 
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Similarly, a direct financial benefit is not limited to a share of the 
infringer’s profits.  The Napster court held that Napster received a direct 
financial benefit from infringing file trading because users’ ability to obtain 
infringing audio files drew them to the service.  Additionally, Napster could 
potentially receive a financial benefit from having attracted a larger user base 
to the service.57 
D. How Long Does Copyright Last? 
Use of most MIRS will involve the exercise of some of the rights of 
copyright owners.  Therefore, the operator of a MIRS will need a license to 
exercise those rights unless the music information is in the public domain.  
Determining whether music information contained in a MIRS is under 
copyright protection will not be an easy task.58  The only hard and fast rule is 
that musical works—that is, musical scores—are in the public domain in the 
United States if they were published prior to 1923.59 
Regrettably, the same cannot be said for early recorded music.  Sound 
recordings were not protected by federal copyright until 1972.60  These 
recordings cannot truly be considered to be in the public domain, however, 
because a number of states have anti-bootlegging laws that apply to the 
unauthorized sale or distribution of sound recordings.  These laws are not 
consistent.  Some limit the claim to those who seek to profit from the sale or 
rental of sound recordings, others provide express exemptions for non-profit 
institutions, and some place time limits on protection.61  Federal law will not 
preempt the effect of these state laws until 2067.62  Thus, even when the 
underlying musical work—say a Scott Joplin rag—has entered the public 
domain, early recordings of that work have not.  This is in stark contrast to the 
approach taken in the European 
 
 57. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023. 
 58. See Lolly Gasaway, When U.S. Works Pass Into the Public Domain, at 
http://www.unc.edu/~unclng/public-d.htm (last updated Nov. 14, 2003) (showing a helpful chart for 
determining when works pass into the public domain). 
 59. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, EXTENSION OF COPYRIGHT TERMS (2003), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15t.pdf (“Works published before January 1, 1923 have fallen into the 
public domain . . . .”).  If the data in a MIRS consist solely of digital copies of public domain sheet music, the 
copyright status of the musical works still must be investigated.  Some publishers of public domain 
compositions claim they have added original material in the arrangement or in the way that they typeset or 
otherwise present the composition.  See Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 31 F.R.D. 3, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 
1962).  In many cases these are dubious claims. 
 60. See, e.g., Robert W. Clarida, Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, LEGAL LANGUAGE SERV., at 
http://www.legallanguage.com/lawarticles/Clarida007.html (Dec. 2000) (describing copyright issues 
surrounding the ownership, duration, and restoration of sound recordings first fixed before February 15, 1972). 
 61. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h(a) (1999) (requiring that use of early recorded sounds must be 
for profit to be actionable.); FLA. STAT. ch. 540.11(6)(c) (2002) (providing express exemption for non-profit 
institutions); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-601 (1999) (Rights to pre-1972 sound recordings are defined in terms 
of a “common law copyright” which expires after fifty-six years.  So, as of January 1, 2004, sound recordings 
made on or before December 31, 1947 were recognized by the State of Colorado as public domain.). 
 62. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2000). 
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Union63—which generally has a more protective copyright regime—where 
sound recordings enter the public domain 50 years after publication.64  The 
effect of this provision is becoming more pronounced as popular music from 
the 1950s begins to enter the public domain in Europe.65 
For post-1923 musical works and post-1972 sound recordings, measuring 
the length of copyright requires knowing whether the author is a known 
individual or the creator’s employer, whether the work was created before or 
after January 1, 1978, and if created before 1978, whether the work was 
published.66  Works created after 1978 are under copyright for the life of the 
author plus 70 years.  If the work was created as a “work made for hire,” the 
term is 95 years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date of 
creation if not published. 
Prior to 1978, copyright lasted for one term of twenty-eight years, which 
could be renewed for another twenty-eight years.  A work published prior to 
1978 will be in the public domain if it was published without a copyright 
notice.  Alternatively, if a work published before 1978 did not have its 
copyright renewed, it is in the public domain.  Otherwise, for works still under 
copyright on January 1, 1978, the term of copyright is effectively ninety-five 
years from the date the copyright was secured. 
E. Ownership and Transfer of Copyright 
Most of the music information in a MIRS will be copyrighted and almost 
all MIRS will exercise at least some of the copyright owners’ rights.  
Consequently, creators and operators of MIRS will likely need to seek 
permission to use the copyrighted music information.  From whom does one 
seek permission? 
As a practical matter, in most cases, licenses should be sought from the 
music publisher for musical works and from the recording company for sound 
recordings.  If a MIRS includes the ability to stream audio works to the public, 
performance licenses will be required.67  For the 
 
 63. Council Decision 2000/278, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L89) 2 (adopting treaty by European Community). 
 64. See World Intellectual Property Organization: Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1997, 
art. 17, 36 I.L.M. 76. 
 65. As of February 2004, Congress was considering proposed responses to this discrepancy in copyright 
protection, to protect American copyright owners from the European public domain.  See Piracy Deterrence 
and Education Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2517 Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing to amend federal 
copyright law to prohibit importation of sound recordings which have entered the public domain under the 
European standard, but which are still under copyright in the United States). 
 66. See, e.g., Richard D. Rose, Connecting the Dots: Navigating the Laws and Licensing Requirements 
of the Internet Music Revolution, 42 IDEA 313, 327 (2002) (providing a helpful chart of copyright status of 
sound recordings by date of fixation and publication). 
 67. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 31, at 244-45. 
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musical works, these licenses can be obtained from the following performing 
rights organizations: The American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers (ASCAP),68 Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI),69 and SESAC, Inc. 
(formerly the Society of European State Authors and Composers).70  Licenses 
for sound recordings can currently be obtained from SoundExchange.71  
However, the U.S. Copyright Office has received petitions to allow other 
performing rights organizations to also play this role.72 
As a background matter, copyrights vest initially with the author(s).73  For 
musical works, this will usually be the composer(s).  Sound recordings often 
have multiple authors, so tracing the rights can be quite complex.  Under the 
“work made for hire” doctrine, the employer will be treated as the author when 
the work was created by an employee acting within the scope of employment, 
or by an independent contractor when there has been a written agreement and 
the work falls within one of nine classes.74 
Copyrights are transferable by contract.75  Under standard business 
practices within the music industry, composers transfer the rights in their 
compositions to the publisher, and those involved in the creation of sound 
recordings transfer their rights to the record label.76  Some powerful artists 
retain their copyrights, and in these cases licenses must be obtained from the 
artists’ representatives. 
II. LEGAL PROTECTION OF DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) creates an obligation 
to respect the technological protection that a copyright owner has placed on 
copies of his or her work.77  For those who own or operate MIRS, these 
provisions require the MIRS not to circumvent technological controls that limit 
access or the ability to exercise one of the exclusive rights—such as the right 
to make copies—attached to the musical information within the MIRS.78  
Additionally, the MIRS must 
 
 68. THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, ASCAP INTEREST LICENSE 
AGREEMENT, at http://www.ascap.com/weblicense (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). 
 69. BMI, DIGITAL LICENSING CENTER, at https://dlc.bmi.com/dlcmenu.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). 
 70. SESAC, LICENSING, at http://www.sesac.com/licensing/licensing1.asp (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). 
 71. See SoundExchange, at http://soundexchange.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2004); U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, WEBCASTING RATES, at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates.html (last visited Mar. 3, 
2004) [hereinafter WEBCASTING RATES]. 
 72. WEBCASTING RATES, supra note 71. 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000). 
 74. See id. §§ 101, 201(b). 
 75. See id. § 204(a). 
 76. See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC, 293-305 (8th ed. 
2000). 
 77. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 78. Id. at 440. 
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not remove or alter “copyright management information” which could include 
information identifying the artist and/or publisher of a musical work or sound 
recording.79  These provisions also provide protection to the owner or operator 
of a MIRS against unauthorized access to technologically protected, 
copyrightable MIRS. 
Section 1201 of the DMCA creates three claims that a copyright owner 
can make with regard to access and copy control technologies: (1) 
unauthorized circumvention of a “technological measure that effectively 
controls access” to a copyrighted work; (2) unauthorized manufacture or 
trafficking in a technology that circumvents a copyright owner’s access control 
technology; and (3) unauthorized manufacture or trafficking in a technology 
that circumvents a copyright owner’s technology that protects one of the 
owner’s exclusive rights.80  The copyright owner’s technology “effectively 
controls access” if the technology requires the application of information (such 
as a password), application of a process, or treatment in order to acquire access 
to a copy of the work.81  A person or a technology “circumvent[s] a 
technological measure” by descrambling, decrypting, or otherwise bypassing, 
removing, deactivating, or impairing the copyright owner’s technology.82 
Some limited exemptions from these claims exist for non-profit libraries, 
archives, and educational institutions; for law enforcement and intelligence-
gathering agencies; those who reverse engineer computer programs; those 
doing research on encryption; those doing security testing; and those who 
circumvent access controls that gather personally identifiable information.83 
Section 1202 of the DMCA sets forth a series of obligations to ensure the 
integrity of so-called “copyright management information,” which the 
copyright owner has associated with the copyrighted work.84  The simplest 
example of such information would be a copyright notice, but the statute also 
includes information identifying the composer, performer, and/or the copyright 
owner, as well as any “terms and conditions for use of the work” within the 
definition of “copyright management information.”85  Section 1202 creates a 
cause of action against someone who makes copies but removes the notice.86  
Digital file formats permit far more extensive forms of metadata to be 
associated 
 
 79. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000). 
 80. Id. §§ 1201(a), (b). 
 81. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B). 
 82. See id. § 1201(a)(3)(A); see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 441. 
 83. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d)-(j) (2000). 
 84. See id. § 1202(b) (prohibiting the removal or alteration of copyright management information); see 
also id. § 1202(c) (defining “copyright management information” as including nearly all “information 
conveyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a work, 
including in digital form, except that such term does not include any personally identifying information about a 
user of a work or of a copy, phonorecord, performance, or display of a work”). 
 85. See id. § 1202(c). 
 86. See id. § 1202(b)(1). 
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with copyrighted works.  Section 1202 gives the copyright owner a basis for 
insisting that this information be replicated in all copies of the work and for 
pursuing those who associate false metadata with the music information.87 
III. PATENT AND TRADE SECRET 
If an invention is novel, non-obvious, and useful, it is patentable in the 
United States.88  Patentable inventions include not only new and useful things 
(i.e. end products), but also new and useful processes or methods.  Judicial 
decisions in the late 1990s have greatly broadened the scope of patent 
coverage, particularly with respect to software and methods of doing 
business.89  As a result, developers of MIRS or software used in MIRS should 
investigate whether the processes embodied in their software infringe an 
existing patent or are themselves patentable.  Obtaining a patent (or 
“prosecuting” a patent) can be an expensive endeavor.  A defensive maneuver 
for software developers, for whom patent protection is not cost-justified, is to 
publish a description of their novel and non-obvious processes.  By making the 
invention public, a developer reduces the risk that another party will claim 
patent protection for the developer’s invention. 
In the European Union, software patents have been more difficult to 
obtain, although about 30,000 such patents have been issued.90  In the wake of 
considerable controversy,91 the European Parliament has adopted an amended 
directive restricting the patentability of software.92 
The downside of publication is the forfeiture of trade secret protection.  
Trade secrets are protected by state law in the United States.93  A trade secret is 
usually defined as information that derives actual or potential economic value 
from not being generally known or readily ascertainable and is subject to 
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.94  Trade secret protection for 
software embodying trade secrets remains in place as long as the software is 
released to the public in object 
 
 87. See id. §§ 1202(a), (b). 
 88. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000). 
 89. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State St. Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 90. FFII: Software Patents in Europe, at http://swpat.ffii.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2004). 
 91. The proposed directive has been very controversial.  See, e.g., Matthew Broersma, Patent Battle to 
Culminate in Brussels, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1012_3-5068007.html (Aug. 26, 
2003). 
 92. See FFII: Software Patents in Europe, Europarl 2003-09-24: Amended Software Patent Directive, at  
http://swpat.ffii.org/papers/europarl0309 (last visited Mar. 5, 2004). 
 93. See MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 2:3 (2003); Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a 
Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 429-35 (1995).  Although state law is the source, 
protection is fairly uniform because most jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  THE 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE UNIFORM 
TRADE SECRETS ACT, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2004). 
 94. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
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code form.95  However, reverse engineering generally is not regarded as theft 
of a trade secret,96 and if a party reverse engineers such software and publicly 
discloses the trade secret(s) contained therein, the information is no longer a 
protected trade secret. 
IV. DATABASE PROTECTION 
The European Union has created a distinct right in otherwise 
uncopyrightable databases,97 and proposals to create a similar right in the 
United States have been considered by Congress over the past six years or so.  
Creation of such a right could have a significant impact on those who design, 
operate, and use MIRS.  Many databases include information from other 
databases, and a right of protection for databases could cause the need for far 
more extensive licensing of current practices.  As of this writing, Congress is 
considering proposed legislation that would provide protection from 
misappropriation likely to harm the market for those databases requiring 
substantial investments to create or maintain.98 
With respect to MIRS, the effect of database legislation would be to 
protect even factual music information, such as bibliographic or other 
metadata.  For example, a complete bibliography or discography of a particular 
artist arranged in alphabetical or chronological order probably would not be an 
original work of authorship protected by copyright.  However, under the 
proposed legislation, such a collection of information would be protected. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property law in the United States is designed to provide 
incentives for investments of time, energy and financial resources in 
innovation.  Necessary trade-offs are made between the rights of innovators, 
follow-on innovators, and users.  In the field of music information, the 
multiplicity of rights holders and licensing agents makes costly the aggregation 
of necessary rights to build or operate a MIRS.  Those who build MIRS also 
should be aware of their own rights bestowed under U.S. intellectual property 
law. 
 
 95. See Stargate Software Int’l, Inc. v. Rumph, 482 S.E.2d 498, 502 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (the term 
“trade secret” applies to data or a program); Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698 
(Minn. 1982) (“unique principles, engineering, logic and coherence in computer software may be accorded 
trade secret status”). 
 96. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (comments) (1985). 
 97. Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. 
 98. See generally Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (provides civil liability, subject to exceptions, for those who misappropriate information 
contained in another’s database). 
